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A call to resist illegitimateauthority

The Summit and
the Peace Movement
FRANK BRODHEAD

How

should the peace movement
organize for the November Summit
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev? Does the Summit hold out the
hope of a significant step toward
peace? Or is it simply a charade, a
posturing by the leaders of the two
leading nuclear powers to soothe
restive allies and quell fears at home?
And does it make any difference?
Should our assessment of the "sincerity" of Reagan and Gorbachev affect
how we organize for peace in the fall of
1985?
It is clear that we can't avoid the

Summit. Already the mass media are
framing the statements and actions by
both governments in terms of how they
will affect the Summit. Like it or not,
we will have to have a ''position'' on
the Summit. Even by the time of this
writing, in early September, many national peace and disarmament organizations have laid plans to focus their
disarmament work for the fall around
the Summit. The Summit seems certain
to function as a whirlpool, drawing our
work and energies towards it, and
throwing off to the periphery that
which can't be related to the Summit.
While at the time of this writing it is
too early to confidently predict the outcome of the Summit, and while the
plans of peace organizations
to
organize around the Summit are still
being formed, I would like to make

some observations about the direction
that this work is taking. For I believe
that the Summit contains many traps
for the peace movement. It also appears that many old divisions within
the peace movement are reemerging
around the Summit. And, particularly
in the relation of the peace movement
to the mass media, there are some new
steps being taken which I believe need
to be carefully examined.
I would like to use one of the several
statements which have been made so
far by national peace organizations to
discuss some of the strategic differences which are implicit in organizing for the Summit. I hope to do this
not in terms of some "correct line,"
but in the spirit of asking questions and
contributing to a discussion. I am also
aware that much of the real work
around the Summit will be done by
local organizers, and that it is their
work that will determine whether the
peace movement will be able to use the
occasion of the Summit to move forward. But we have learned over the
years that how issues and problems are
framed at a national level can greatly
help or hinder the work of peace
education, and can strengthen or
weaken the effectiveness of local work.
The Directors' Forum Strategy

Perhaps the most ambitious strategy
for the Summit conceived so far grew
out of the Directors' Forum, an informal coalition of some two dozen arms
control and peace organizations, mostly Washington-based. In a nutshell, the
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strategy of the Directors' Forum is to
raise expectations. The Reagan administration has maintained that the
Summit is simply a "get aquainted"
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, and it has attempted to
dampen any hopes that significant
steps toward peace and disarmament
might emerge from the meeting. The
strategy coming out of the Directors'
Forum is to work with the media and,
at the local level, to educate people
about what could be accomplished at
the Summit if there was a will to do so.
It is evident that part of the "raising
expectations'' strategy necessarily implies giving legitimacy to the Summit.
It would not be possible to maintain
the position, at least publicly, that the
Summit is a fraud and that Reagan is a
hypocrite, for example, if we want to
"raise expectations" around the Summit. Such a view is certainly far from
the stance of the Directors' Forum,
whose statement calls the Summit ''an
opportunity for increasing mutual
security." "All Americans and indeed
the entire world should applaud this
forthcoming meeting of the two superpower leaders,'' says the introduction
to the statement. "They alone are in a
position to break the deadlock and to
make real progress in negotiating limits
on the arms race in offensive and
defensive weapons, deep reductions in
the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two
countries, and the lessening of tensions
between the United States and the
Soviet Union.''
Continued on page Two

Summit
Continued from page One

I think this position of "applauding
the Summit" raises some real problems. By granting the "sincerity" of
Reagan and the Reagan administration
we fall into the trap of the "Search for
Peace,'' a strategy which has served
this and earlier U.S. presidents well in
quelling domestic discontent and the
worries of the Allies about U.S. intervention and the relentless march of
the nuclear build-up. I would like to
defer a discussion of the ''search for
peace" for a few moments and comment here only on the dynamics of
truth and "sincerity" in our own
movement.
While part of the "raising expectations'' strategy undoubtedly includes a
residual hope that (if enough people
agitated for concrete steps for peace)
something good might come out of the
Summit, I believe that most peace activists share my skepticism that the
Reagan administration has the least intention of moderating its arms buildup. If this is so, then the "raising expectations'' strategy can only be seen
as manipulative. We will raise expectations only to have them dashed. In this
process, presumably, we will be in a
position to capitalize on the disappointed hopes that we have raised. This
is an ancient strategy, and one that I
have never liked. It sets up a poisonous
dynamic between leaders who ''know''
that our demands are unrealistic, and
naive followers who are not yet ready
for the truth.
It is also an impractical strategy,
because good organizers will reject it:
fighting against the manipulation of
the truth by the government, they are
not likely to be enthusiastic about
manipulating the truth in their own
work. The "applauding the Summit"
strategy therefore leaves this latter
group without guidance. What is
''really going on'' with the Summit will
have to be figured out at the local level,
as the national body has abdicated its
responsibilities to help us understand
what the Summit is about.
Let us return to the main body of the
Directors' Forum statement. The campaign to "raise expectations" will be
focused on a short list of disarmament
demands which, the statement correctly points out, could be accomplished at
Geneva with the stroke of a pen. The
statement calls on Reagan and Gorbachev to take the following steps:
1. Refrain from undercutting or
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abrogating the SALT agreement on offensive weapons;
2. Reaffirm their commitment to the
ABM Treaty;
3. Agree to a moratorium on testing .
ASAT weapons;
4. Bar encryption (or coding) of data
radioed back to Earth during weapons
tests;
5. Refrain from deploying any new
MIRVed missiles, such as the MX;
6. Agree to a halt in nuclear tests
pending the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban; and
7. Agree in principle to an interim
arms accord, which ·could include
reductions in both launchers and
warheads.
Now some comments are in order on
these demands, because - while they
are certainly vital steps towards peace
- what is stated and what is unstated
raises some well-known issues of disarmament strategy.
First, the statement assumes that
what we want are bi-lateral
agreements: ''The President and the
General Secretary, by agreeing in
Geneva to one or more of the following
steps ....
"Thus the statement maintains the bi-lateralism that became
dogma in the early days of the Freeze
movement. While now, just as then,
there is a certain safety against the
charge of being a "communist dupe"
which is inevitably directed against advocates of unilateral initiatives by the
United States, a dogmatic bi-lateralism
necessarily contributes to the mar- ·
ginalizing of unilateralists,
both
pacifists and nonpacifists alike. At
times it even functions as a kind of
anti-communism within the peace
movement: "We are not suspect and
unpatriotic unilateralists, but responsible bi-lateralists,'' etc.
Furthermore, there is a price to pay
for the rejection of strategies or
demands based on unilateral initiatives. During the campaign against
the Euromissiles - the deployment of
U.S.-controlled cruise and Pershing II
missiles in Europe - we often found
ourselves estranged from our allies in
the European peace movements, who
called for unilateral initiatives towards
disarmament. And we soon found ourselves in a trap, in which we had to adjust our bi-lateral-agreement strategies
to the practical necessity of working to
put a unilateral halt to the funding and
deployment of the cruise or the MX.
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More broadly, a bi-lateral framework
makes our disarmament strategies
hostage to the agreement of the
Soviets: we commit ourselves to disarming only if the Soviet Union takes
similar steps. In essence, bi-lateralism
is locked into an acceptance of deterrence.
Finally, in relation to the forthcoming Summit, bi-lateralism is impractical. We would be speaking more
truthfully and with greater clarity if we
were calling on President Reagan to
match the umlateral halt in nuclear
testing by the Soviets, and in unilaterally refraining from going ahead
with the test of anti-satellite weapons.
We are not taking advantage of the
alleged opportunity given us by the
Summit for peace education if we
refrain from educating people that the
security of the United States and the
rest of the world would be greatly furthered if President Reagan took the
steps listed above on his own. As
Daniel Ellsberg noted in a recent article
in Nuclear Times, we have to face the
hard job of helping people to understand that the new weapons systems
now being developed and deployed
dangerously increase our insecurity,
and that they are the opposite of deterrence.
Continued on page Six
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Guatemala: 1985
JACK SPENCE
Last June and July, the author joined
the sixth national delegation of Faculty
for Human Rights in El Salvador and
Central America on a fact finding tour
of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador
and Nicaragua. He teaches Latin
American Politics at the University of
Massachusetts-Boston.

Guatemala
may be having a
presidential election in November. In
early September, a rise in transit fares
triggered widespread street protests.
Riot police put these down, and five
hundred troops invaded the national
San Carlos University, violating its
legal autonomy. Rumors of a coup
were fed by the unrest.
In June these tensions were not far
beneath the surface. Even in the
swank, dark paneled club with
panoramic views of the city, where
leading members of the private sector
had invited our delegation to a filet
mignon lunch, the self assured, confident picture of the private sector being
presented to us had evident cracks.
Guatemala's currency, the quetzal, had
been flying high for years, maintaining
parity with the dollar. Now it was falling like a stone. Businesses depending
on imports faced increased costs and
the businessmen complained that the
weak quetzal depressed the enthusiasm
and aspirations of their managers. In
January a manager could buy a color
TV with one month's pay, but now
could hardly get a black and white for
the same price.
The military government, with its
"populist" programs, had messed up
the economy, we were told. We later
heard that private sector figures had
tried to engineer a coup, but that they
had also been quite successful in wringing substantial benefits from the current government.
The business moguls spoke enthusiastically about the coming election, as
they handed us copies of an American
Heritage Foundation tract about why
the U.S. should provide balance of
payments
and military
aid to
Guatemala. They and the U.S. em-

#179

bassy saw the election as the path to
aid, but had misgivings about the candidates. Sandoval Alarcon, head of the
paramilitary right wing MLN "party"
formed during the U.S. sponsored
1954 overthrow of the progressive
Arbenz government, was a staunch
anti-communist, but was a "man of
the fifties." Vinicio Cerezo, of the
Christian Democrats, was not to be
trusted despite his pledge of ''no
reforms." Jorge Carpio, medio tycoon, had the best public relations, but
no experience and no program. But the
election was to be a "great thing."
We asked about trade unions and the
famous Coca Cola plant trade union.
The union had illegally taken over the
plant, the business leaders said, after a
perfectly legal closing of the plant due
to bankruptcy. The owners had been
threatened with violence. Unions in
general were violence prone and
disruptive of a tranquil investment
climate. But, they conceded, the
unions were not very strong in
Guatemala because they could only
organize by shop.
After lunch I decided it was time to
carry a message to the Coca Cola
workers from an American friend who
had helped occupy the bottling plant
for a few nights during the workers'
takeover last year. This had been the
second major battle at the plant in five
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years. During 1978-80, the workers had
battled for union rights. The plant
cafeteria now has large photos of 8
workers who were picked off by death
squads during the struggle. An international campaign against Coca Cola
eventually forced Coke to dump the
repressive American owner.
The head of the union, Rodolfo
Robles, greeted me. Work was out for
the day. A class for some forty workers
on trade unionism was just breaking
up, and he and five members of the
steering committee recounted the most
recent battle with Coke and the
military government.
On February 17, 1984 the owners
suddenly announced that the enterprise
was a failure, and closed the plant. The
workers immediately occupied the
premises. The owners then offered
about 6 months severance pay. The
workers demanded that the money be
used to keep the factory in operation.
Both owners soon thereafter left the
country, and the workers sued them
for closing a plant without proper legal
notice. But the courts, unable to summon the defendants, rejected the
claims.
For the first few days all 478 workers
occupied the plant on a 24 hour basis,
while the police surrounded the plant.
The workers then approached Coca

Continued on page Four
Page Three

Guatemala
Continued from page Three
Cola International. As days stretched
into payless weeks, and weeks into
months, about one hundred workers
had to drop out. Of the remainder,
eighty were organized into work teams
to find work to support the families of
all. The rest divided into two teams,
each occupying the factory for 24
hours shifts.
Again, they organized an international campaign to get Coke to reopen
the plant. After 3 ½ months, Coke
recognized the union, and agreed to
2 ½ months back pay, to set up a small
trust fund for the survivors of the 8
martyrs from 1978-80, and to start
looking for a new owner.
It took ten more months for the
plant to be reopened. According to the
business leaders at the aforementioned
lunch, the U.S. embassy was frantically asking business associations to find
an owner if they wanted to improve
Guatemala's human rights profile in
the U.S., but no one wanted to touch
the deal because of the ''violent''
union. Finally, the Porra family agreed
to operate the franchise.
But the Porra's and Coke refused to
negotiate any compensation for the
months of closure. The eventual agreement included a 45 hour work week
(5 ½ days), a minimum salary of 150
Quetzales per month (my rough
estimate of costs for a family of six for
just corn, beans, rice, cooking oil and
cooking fuel in June was about 60-70
Q's per month, with rent another 3040). The Union won an office and a
small conference room, subsidized
lunches, and small life insurance and
retirement benefits.
But the Porras agreed to hire only
265 of the workers putting the remaining 85 on a first-hire waiting list, with
no requirement that anyone be hired.
As of June, 32 had been hired. I asked
whether seniority determined the list of
85. At a union meeting to discuss the
negotiations, the bargaining team was
authorized to accept the off er. Then 85
volunteers stepped forward to place
themselves on the waiting list. They
had been out of work almost a year.
It was late afternoon now. They gave
me a detailed tour of the plant, explaining each detail of production. In
the cafeteria, they told me about each
of the eight pictured martyrs. We
toured the truck and auto shop area
that was filled with familiar Coke
trucks, and then went to a lively soccer
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game on a field in the back. Finally
they took me to see the shrine for
assassinated workers near the field.
In the context of Guatemala, the
long struggle of the Coke workers is
heroic. The urban labor movement was
repressed until the liberal presidencies
of Arevalo and Arbenz during the
1944-54 era. Workers won a national
minimum wage, the eight hour day and
the right to organize. By 1954, from a
base of near zero, some 10% of the
economically active population belonged to unions. The U.S. sponsored
'54 coup targeted trade unions. Most
active unions . were destroyed in short
order, their leaders assassinated or jailed. Twenty years of repression later,
only 1.6% of the active labor force
were members of unions.
But the union movement grew in the
1970's as did many other forms of
popular mobilization. Repression did
not stop, but unions in many sectors
were formed, and in many cases struck
for better working conditions and in
the mid-70's there were monthly conflicts. The high point came in 1977
when tungsten miners from an isolated
village called Ixtahuacan, after four
years of struggle for better working
conditions and union recognition,
marched two hundred and fifty miles
to the capital city. Nothing like this
had ever happened. Before they reached the capital, the government, trying
to head off protest, forced the company to accede to the demands, but the
miners marched on, fortified by the
support they had received along the
way. A spontaneous demonstration of

100,000 greeted them in Guatemala City, a city of 1 million. But in the next
three years the ongoing repression
escalated sharply. Four of the miners'
leaders were assassinated, and one was
tortured to death while his wife was
forced to watch.
It was in this context of mobilization
and repression that the earlier Coca
Cola battle was waged, at the cost of
eight workers' lives. By the early 80's,
the repression gained the upper hand.
The Coca Cola workers estimated that
by 1979 there were 600 burgeoning active unions in the country. Now there is
an official list of 117 unions, but the
majority of those exist only as pieces of
paper, they said.
The Coca Cola workers could not
have won this most recent victory without impressive discipline, solidarity
and courage. But the irony of their victory in 1984-85 is that in the prevailing
climate of repression it could not have
been won but for the fact that they
were battling a famous multinational
corporation, indeed, the very symbol
of U.S. foreign investment. This
generated the crucial international support.
Our visit to the U.S. Embassy found
a more upbeat view of the human
rights picture. Their statistics on
assassinations are gleaned from accounts in the newspapers, all of which
are right-wing. The trend was down.
They pointed with pride to last year's
constituent assembly election, anticipating the November presidential
election.

JOIN HANDS WITH THE
PEOPLE OF GUATEMALA!

I

I
I

On October 20, 1944 an uprising brought down
the hated Ubico dictatorship - and ushered in
an unprecedented period of democracy. The
CIA-engineered coup d'etat of 1954 marked the
end of Guatemala's "Ten Years of Spring".
This October individuals and groups across the
nation will be re-affirming their solidarity with
the people of Guatemala by participating in the
'.:>ctober20 Humanitarian Aid Day - you can too!
Funds raised will go to self-help refugee projects
in Guatemala and Mexico.

I

I
I

Please make checks payable to "NISGUA,,
NISGUA

930 "F'' Street, Washington, D.C.
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The military attache, snappy in his
Ranger uniform, could hardly contain
his enthusiasm for the Guatemalan
military's "genius." Four years earlier
the country had been on the verge of
"going down the tubes" until able
commanders had stepped forward and,
making "hard decisions," waged an
effective "counter terror" campaign
based on "relentless patrolling."
Only the "sluggish" performance of
the economy dimmed these bright
views. But human rights improvements
and elections would help cure this
problem by bringing in much needed
U.S. balance of payments assistance
and foreign investment.
Other interviews of Church officials
and academics revealed a grim picture.
We interviewed one of the top Church
officials in the country in our hotel dining room. He whispered answers to our
questions for 90 minutes changing the
topic to the fruit cup or the weather
whenever a waiter passed by. He and
the Archbishop in a later interview
detailed recent human rights abuses including the assassination
of two
members of the Mutual Support
Group, made up of families of the
disappeared
and assassinated.
We
learned that many disappearances and
assassinations
do not make the
newspapers (or the Embassy statistics)
because terrified families of, say a
missing student, beg student groups
not to publically denounce the crime.
The "hard decisions" mentioned by
the military attache refer to the
scorched earth campaign waged during
1980-83. Based on a count of orphans,
the Church estimates that between 30
and 60,000 civilians were killed during
this campaign in the highlands where
the main guerrillas groups had gained
considerable popular support. One of
every seven Guatemalans was displaced. Despite the campaign, another
analyst told us, contrary to the
attache's account, that adding up
military reports suggests that the guerrillas have had their territory of operation reduced, but had not suffered
many military casualties.
The economy, during this repressive
offensive,
plunged downhill.
The
' questazal, at 1 to 1 dollar for years,
was 1.8 in November, and 3.1 in June.
By the end of last year 44% of the
economically active population was
un- or underemployed
(10.2%
unemployed). By 1984, gross domestic
product per capita had shrunk to the
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level of 1971. Even by the estimate of
one Embassy economist, it could not
be expected to achieve the level of 1982
before the late 1990's.
A visit to a government housing project, Campamento Temporada Betania, brought home the meaning of these
statistics. The 368 families have moved
into the city to escape military activity,
or to find work since losing their land.
Each family of 6 to 10 lives in one
10x13 windowless room. Smoke from a
wood cook fire in an adjoining lean-to
fills the room. Infant mortality,
according to a health worker, is 100 per
1000, above the national average of 67
(it is 22 per thousand in Cuba, 17 in the
U.S.). There is a common, and open,
latrine. The mother of one family of
eight I interviewed made do on about
80 quetzales a month, earned in irregular mason work hours from the city by her husband. His pay covered
beans, rice, corn, and fuel (not eggs or
meat) and the low six quetzal rent with
about 15 quetzales to spare. (A cheap
pair of tennis shoes is Q 17.) This family had petitioned for four years for the
privilege of living in this project with
its rents at 20% of market rates.
None of the leading presidential candidates in the much heralded election
has a program to address these problems. Any program would require
radical change. In the last five years
some 300 Christian Democrats slightly
to the left of center have been assassinated. Of the major candidates, the
one farthest to the left (which puts him
right of center) is running on a platform of no reform.
Should the election come off, it may
be sufficient to gain from Congress the
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military assistance and financial aid the
Reagan administration and the Guatemalan business leaders so clearly
desire. But the election will be largely
irrelevant to the short lives of the
residents of Temporada Betania. And
it holds out little hope for the Coca
Cola workers struggling to rebuild,
once again, the trade union movement
in the face of massive state repression.

The Resist Pledge System
The most important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!
Yes, I would like to pledge $
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name ___________

_

Address ________
City ___

State __

_
Zip___

_
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Summit
Continued from page Two

A second deficiency of the statement
concerns its scope. Even after some
three years of "Deadly Connections"
conferences, and even though the Summit itself will take up "regional concerns," the disarmament strategy
represented by the statement still treats
the issue of nuclear weapons in a
vacuum. It returns us to that moment
in 1982 when the great June 12th
demonstration could not address the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which as
much as anything going on that day
had a finger on the trigger of nuclear
war. It was largely in response to this
failure, and to the lack of understanding which this failure grew out of, that
disarmament activists developed the
concept of the "Deadly Connection"
and held dozens of conferences across
the United States to discuss the cr1nnections between intervention and r uclear
war. Indeed, many of the sign::.t-Jries of
the Directors' Forum statem,~r..tare on
record as opposing U.S. inter·1ention in
Central America, the Midd,~ East, and
in Asia and the Pacific 1Jcean, and
some have done ''Deadly Connections" work themselves. Thus the
statement shows that, whatever our
collective intellectual understanding of
how to prevent nuclear war, when the
chips are down and the coalitions are
formed a substantial and important
part of the peace movement will still
accept - and even enforce - the
separation of "disarmament" from
''anti-intervention.''
These are old arguments. Yet I think
there is something new here as well. I
think that the division of the peace
movement into "disarmament" and
"anti-intervention," and the rejection
of unilateralism in favor of bi-lateralism - and, indeed, the stance of "applauding the Summit'' - are strongly
reinforced by the recent surge of interest within disarmament organizations in the media. Partly as a result of
the failure of the Mondale candidacy, I
believe, and more generally as a result
of the decline of media enthusiasm for
the Freeze, many people are turning to
media analyses and media consultants
in an attempt to help the peace movement regain some initiative.
One study by Daniel Yankelovich
Associates on the attitudes of U.S.
citizens towards war and peace issues
has been very influential in disarmament organizations. WAND is currently carying out a large-scale study in an
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Bas, Greece

attempt to make its strategy more effective. And a "Peace Media Project,"
initiated by some Washington, D.C.based groups last April, approached
many media consultants and people in
the news industry for insights into how
the peace movement can improve its
acceptability - and thus its access to the media, and how it can use the
media to reach the American people
more effectively.
There can certainly be no quarrel
with gaining a better understanding of
how the media works and how we can
use it more effectively. But I think this
work also raises many questions. While
there is not the space to go into all of
them here, I think one of the outcomes
of this focus on the media has been to
place an additional conservative
pressure on our work, giving an imprint of "science" to the view that in
order to "reach people" we must appear ''more responsible,'' so that the
media ''will take us seriously.'' -This
focus on the media has so far not addressed the issues of media bias and the
concentration of ownership of the
media by corporations that have their
own interests. It assumes away the
voluminous evidence that the U.S.
media functions as a ''Free World propaganda system,'' and takes for
granted the media's own claims to be a
neutral marketplace of ideas and information. It places a premium on playing
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by the rules rather than changing the
rules. It is unrealistic. And we end up
"applauding" charades like the Summit, unable to speak the truth because
we will be marginalized.
The Search for Peace
I would like to conclude by urging
that we include in our peace work and
in our preparations for the Summit
some thought about how to respond to
the peace theatrics of the Reagan administration. Rather than taking the
Summit (and "Geneva," and the lip
service to the "Contadora process,"
and our commitment to ''constructive
engagement") at face value, I believe
we need to become more conscious of
the "Search for Peace" as a tool of
foreign intervention and the escalation
of the arms race.
The Search for Peace is, in our era's
Orwellian logic, an accompaniment of
war or part of the preparation for war.
While in some respects it is as old as
warfare itself, it has assumed a special
importance in the last two decades. It
was during the Vietnam War, and the
consequent erosion of automatic support for the U.S. imperial enterprise,
that successive U.S. presidential adminstrations learned to hone to a fine
art the appearance of searching for
peace while escalating the war. Much
to our sorrow we are still learning
about the sustained duplicity which ac-
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companied that war, of the coups that
were organized each time neutralism
raised its head in South Vietnam, and
of the escalations in the bombing that
were ordered each time that peace
seemed about to break out. Seymour
Hersh's recent study of Kissinger is only the latest of a string of excellent
books which have documented how the
Search for Peace was used as a
camoflage to sustain the Vietnam War.
Both then and now, the Search for
Peace depends on the cooperation of
the Western media. Unlike the Soviet
bloc media which is government controlled, and therefore regarded with
suspicion by Soviet-bloc citizens, the
privately owned Western media appear
on the surface to be free of the taint of
government control. This appearance
of independence - jealously guarded
by the owners of the media - renders
it even more effective than the Soviet
media as a propaganda system. While a
serious reader can find volumes of
facts and information which contradict
the version of reality being put forward
by Western governments, the headlines
and front-page stories - not to mention the far more simplistic television
network news - almost invariably
support the positions of their own
governments. Over and above the patriotic assumptions of writers, editors,
and owners, and even discounting the
boundaries of permissability established by the giant capitalistic corporations that own the vast majority of
media outlets, the Western media function as a propaganda system by putting
certain questions on the agenda and
keeping others off, by asking some
questions and not others.
Regarding the Search for Peace, we
need only remind ourselves that during
the entire history of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam the media never
framed the U.S. military mission in
terms of an invasion of Vietnam. It accepted largely at face value the
Johnson administration's claim that
the invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965 was to halt a communist revolution. It treated sympathetically the Reagan administration's claim that its purpose in invading Grenada was to rescue students.
No matter what degree of culpability
its own news stories display about the
responsibility of the CIA for suffering
and death in Nicaragua, it cannot bring
itself to describe our actions there as
state-terrorism, reserving this epithet
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for Iran, Libya, and other officially
sanctioned enemies. It automatically
follows the Reagan administration in
dismissing the Soviet moratorium on
nuclear testing as a ''propaganda
stunt."
Thanks to Strobe Talbot's book
Deadly Gambits, and to the work of
other authors, we know quite a bit
about the Reagan administration's
commitment to arms negotiations.
Talbot, the Washington bureau chief
for Time magazine, clearly shows that
the Reagan administration treated the
Geneva negotiations
about ''intermediate range" nuclear weapons as
a problem of ''alliance management.''
''The object of making a proposal and
undertaking negotations, '' he writes,
"was damage limitation, public relations, and getting the new NATO
missiles deployed with a minimum of
anguish and recrimination inside the
alliance"
(p. 62). He describes
something of the massive propaganda
campaign which the Reagan administration carried out in Europe in
an attempt to appease the Centrist
politicians who were alarmed ,by the
massive peace demonstrations. He
makes it evident that the ''zero
option'' proposal put forward by the
United States was deliberately intended
to fail, in order that the deployment of
the missiles could go · forward. He
describes negotiator Paul Nitze's concern that ''a breakthrough was required not so much for the sake of
arms control, for which he was no
great enthusiast, but for the sake of
American political and military interests, particularly in NATO. He was
not so much concerned about EastWest relations as West-West relations"
(p. 115). He cites Richard Burt's assertion that, as Talbot puts it, "the principal purpose of the various official
advertising campaigns on behalf of
U.S. policy should be to do everything
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possible to make sure that deployment
went ahead on schedule." (p. 164).
In short, the purpose of arms control
negotiations under Reagan was, and I
believe still is, to serve as a cover by
which the arms build-up can forge
ahead. At no point was the "sincerity"
of Reagan and his arms control
negotiators challenged by the mainstream media in the United States. But
just as was the case during the Vietnam
War, in retrospect we learn that the
negotiations were a fraud, that they
were designed to raise hopes for peace
and to make it appear that they were
dashed only because of the intransigence of our official enemies.
The same cast of characters that unsuccessfully Searched for Peace during
the first term of the Reagan administration are guiding the U.S.
strategy toward the Summit. There is
no indication that they have changed
their views; and their commitment to
Star Wars, to continued nuclear
testing, and to going ahead with the
testing of anti-satellite weapons can
only be viewed as a sign of their determination to continue the arms build-up
which they have started. By refraining
from denouncing the Reagan administration's approach to the Summit as
fraudulent, the peace movement will
further legitimize - and render more
effective by being unchallenged - the
Search for Peace as a tool for engineering a consensus behind U.S. foreign
policy. We need to understand what is
going on with the Summit and, rather
than applauding it, we must try to prevent it from succeeding in its purpose
of legitimizing the continuation of the
arms race.

Frank Brodhead is a member of the
Resist board and an author who writes
for several progressive publications.
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Conference of Black Organizers, c/ o

Georgia Citizen Coalition on Hunger,
136 Marietta St., N.W. No. 220,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303.
The National Black Organizers
Educational/Training Campaign was
organized by an independent network
of Black organizers from several
peace and justice groups. Their conference last May was the first successful effort to bring organizers and
organizations within the Black community together around the impact of
the U.S. military and militarism on
the Black community. More than 50
organizers and activists from seven
southern states and some northern
states gathered in Charlotte, NC,
reflecting struggles and constituencies
involving issues of housing, countermilitary recruitment, labor, racist
violence, communication, education
and research, law, peace, civics,
culture, anti-apartheid, antiintervention/liberation support and
religion. Some 33 organizations were
represented, and of these 33, some 19
were represented by women or included women in their delegations. This
conference marked the first stage of
their campaign, spearheading increased support and participation by
many segments of the black community in a national effort. Since
then, the National Black Organizers
Campaign has held local forums,
follow-up training workshops, a tour
of the South by the national coordinators, and another large national
conference in September. Resist's
grant of $600 went towards the costs
of this recent national conference.
AMES (The Association of
Salvadoran Women), P .0. Box
40311, San Francisco, CA 94140

AMES is a voice, a tool, a collective means through which Salvadoran
women can work for equality and
justice currently lacking in their
homeland. AMES was legally constituted in September 1979 at an
assembly honoring activist Isaura
Gomez and her 12 year old daughter,
both assassinated by Salvadoran
security forces. Since 1979, over
10,000 women in El Salvador have
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joined AMES. Chapters have been
opened in the U.S., Canada,
Nicaragua and Europe. As a broadbased democratic organization composed of Salvadoran women without
regard for religion, education, or
social class, their membership includes homemakers, peasants,
students, professionals, laborers,
market vendors, and refugees. AMES
provides Salvadoran women with the
organizing, leadership, and media
skills essential to the participation in
community projects, events and decisions. By necessity, their advocacy
must currently focus on securing the
basics of survival - drinking water,
food, housing, medical care and fair
wages. Ultimately, they seek to
transform El Salvador into a society
which honors human rights, equality
for women, and the well-being of its
children. In the U.S. and Canada
their goal is to educate North
Americans about conditions in El
Salvador, especially as they affect
women and children, in order to
create active opposition to U.S. intervention in El Salvador. Resist's
grant of $600 went towards the
publicity for a film, "For a Woman
in El Salvador,'' which AMES will
use in its organizing efforts.

the U.S. and which has denied people
with disabilities access to buses, will
hold its convention in Los Angeles.
ADAPT is planning to bring 300
disabled protestors to LA to push for
their demands for accessible public
transit. They are demanding that
APT A go on record calling for 1000/o
accessibility for all public transit
systems; that APTA serve notice on
all bus manufacturers that its
members will buy only wheelchair accessible buses; that APT A urge the
federal government to reinstate the
regulation mandating that all public
transit be accessible to all people. A
Resist grant of $300 will be used to
assist ADAPT in paying telephone
bills incurred in organizing this national action.
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ADAPT (American Disabled for Access Public Transit), 4536 East Col-

fax, Denver, CO 80220.
ADAPT is a national coalition of
severely disabled people, most of
whom live on a benefit income of
$350 per month. Members of this
coalition are veterans of several national actions and protests in the
struggle for their right to ride public
transportation. Led by disabled community organizers from the Atlantis
Community in Denver, they have
learned to define their issues,
strategize actions to win them, carry
out public protests, talk to the press,
resort to civil disobedience and go to
jail, thereby overcoming their personal and public images as objects of
pity to become people of power. During October 1985, the American
Public Transit Association (APT A), ·
which represents all transit districts in
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Thousands of people are working hard
for disarmament and social justice and
against domestic oppression and US
military intervention in Central America.
Keep in touch with news of the nonviolent social change movements in the
six-state New England region. Subscribe
to Peacework, the Peace and Social
Justice Newsletter published monthly
since 1972 by the regional office of the
American Friends Service Committee.
Join the New Englanders who value
Peacework as the source of timely,
lively, accurate and inspirational news
and organizing ideas !
Enclosed is $__
for my Peacework
subscription. (Rates are $5 by third
class mail - a $2 savings off the regular
rate for new subscribers - or $10 by
first class mail.)
Send to Peacework, 2161 Mass. Ave.,
Cambridge, MA 02140.
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